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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
Haziz Self (“Haziz”) was sentenced to 120 months‟ 
imprisonment after being convicted on two counts of 
distributing crack cocaine.  On appeal, Haziz raises a number 
of challenges to both the underlying convictions and the 
subsequent sentence.  We will affirm the convictions but 
vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.   
 
I.  Background 
A.  Underlying Offense 
On March 4, 2009, a confidential informant (“CI”) 
made a series of recorded telephone calls to Haziz‟s brother, 
Rahmmar Self (“Rahmmar”), to arrange for the purchase of 
one-half ounce of crack cocaine.  In those conversations, 
Rahmmar instructed the CI to proceed to his house to buy the 
drugs and informed him that “[m]y brother is going to meet 
you.”  While wearing concealed audio and video recording 
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devices, the CI proceeded to the house, where he purchased 
approximately twelve grams of crack from Haziz for a price 
of $500.  Based on this transaction, a grand jury in 
Philadelphia returned a two count indictment charging Haziz 
and Rahmmar with: (1) distribution of five grams or more of 
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and (2) 
distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a housing 
facility owned by a public housing authority, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 860(a).
1
   
 
B.  Disqualification 
Haziz was initially represented by a court-appointed 
attorney, but Mark Greenberg, Esq. (“Greenberg”), entered an 
appearance on behalf of Haziz on September 10, 2009.  That 
same day, Barnaby Wittels, Esq. (“Wittels”), entered an 
appearance on behalf of Rahmmar.  Greenberg and Wittels 
are attorneys in the same four-lawyer firm, Lacheen Wittels & 
Greenberg, LLP.   
 
Shortly after Greenberg and Wittels entered their 
appearances, the government raised the potential conflict of 
interest created by the same firm representing the two co-
defendants.  Magistrate Judge Elizabeth T. Hey conducted a 
hearing in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 44(c), during which both Greenberg and Wittels 
stated that they did not believe that a conflict would arise 
from their joint representation, and both defendants waived 
their right to be represented by conflict-free counsel.  Several 
weeks later, U.S. District Judge John R. Padova questioned 
each defendant separately.  Again, Wittels and Greenberg 
stated that they foresaw no potential conflict.  Rahmmar, who 
has a tenth-grade education, again waived any conflict of 
interest.  Haziz, who completed high school, asked Judge 
Padova to explain how a conflict might manifest itself, 
requested a court recess to consider his options, and waived 
any conflict after discussing the issue with his attorney.   
                                                 
1
 The grand jury subsequently returned a superseding 
indictment adding five drug-related counts against Rahmmar 
only. 
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Two days after this hearing, Wittels had an apparent 
change of heart and moved to withdraw his representation on 
conflict grounds.  In his motion, Wittels explained:  
 
After reflection it is apparent to undersigned 
counsel that no workable protocol can be 
created that will satisfy the court‟s concerns and 
that no workable “Chinese Wall” could be 
erected in what is a four lawyer firm in which 
the offices of counsel in this case are adjacent to 
one another and in which there is a common 
receptionist.  
 
U.S. District Judge Paul S. Diamond, to whom the case had 
been reassigned, held a hearing on Wittels‟ motion to 
withdraw.  At the hearing, Wittels acknowledged that it was 
“very unusual for two lawyers in one firm to represent co-
defendants in a federal case,” and further explained that he 
now believed that the joint representation “would create a 
situation in which it would only damage the attorneys and my 
client.  The potential for problems is just too great.”   
 
After the District Court granted Wittels‟ motion to 
withdraw, it questioned Greenberg about why he should not 
also be disqualified, stating: “I am concerned about your 
ability vigorously to represent your client against, possibly 
against, the interests of another person, who was very recently 
a client of your firm.”  Although Greenberg asserted that his 
representation of Haziz would not be limited by his firm‟s 
prior representation of Rahmmar, the Court remained 
concerned about a potential conflict.  The hearing concluded 
with a discussion of two motions to continue the trial: one 
filed by the government, and the other filed by Wittels prior to 
his withdrawal.  Greenberg objected to the government‟s 
motion, stating that Haziz was “ready to go to trial and we‟re 
prepared to go to trial.”  However, Greenberg also stated that 
he did not object to Wittels‟ motion for a continuance, a 
contradictory position that the Court believed “may well 
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underscore the need for two new counsel in this case.”2  
 
On December 30, 2009, the District Court ordered that 
Greenberg be disqualified due to a serious potential for 
conflict.  In a meticulous opinion accompanying the order, the 
Court explained that “Greenberg‟s continued presence in this 
case presents a minefield of potential problems that would 
compel me constantly to evaluate whether he is acting in the 
best interest of his firm‟s existing client or in his firm‟s 
former client.”  The Court then appointed Jeremy Ibrahim, 
Esq., as Haziz‟s new defense counsel.   
 
C.  Trial 
 Haziz‟s trial began on June 22, 2010.3  Simply put, the 
government‟s evidence of guilt was very strong.  In addition 
to the eyewitness testimony of several ATF agents, the 
government also produced audio and video recordings of the 
CI‟s drug transaction with Haziz.  Additionally, the CI 
testified that after making arrangements with Rahmmar over 
the phone, he purchased two baggies of crack cocaine from 
Haziz, whom he knew personally.  His testimony continued:   
 
I went in there, gave [Haziz] the money right 
away, he counted it, he told me that -- that he -- 
you know, he don‟t do this anymore, he was just 
doing a favor for his -- for his brother.  After 
that he gave me the crack cocaine and I 
proceeded to leave. 
 
The government also called Ninan Varughese 
(“Varughese”), a forensic chemist employed by the 
Philadelphia Police Department Chemistry Laboratory.  
Varughese testified that he tested the substance in one of the 
                                                 
2
 After the District Court expressed some exasperation about 
this contradictory stance, Greenberg backtracked and stated 
that he also objected to Wittels‟ motion to continue the trial. 
 
3
 Rahmmar pled guilty on May 17, 2010 and was 
subsequently sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment. 
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two baggies purchased by the CI and determined that it 
contained cocaine base, that the tested bag contained 5.494 
grams of cocaine base, and that the total weight of both 
baggies was 12.05 grams.   
 
Finally, the government called Devinearth Freeman 
(“Freeman”), Haziz‟s niece, who lived in the same house as 
Haziz and was present in the house at the time of the drug 
transaction with the CI.  Upon being interviewed by ATF 
agents prior to trial, Freeman had refused to say whether 
Haziz was present at the time of the transaction.  At trial, 
when Freeman was shown a video recording of the 
transaction, she claimed to be unable to identify Haziz in the 
video.  This led to the following exchange, as the prosecutor 
questioned Freeman about her possible bias: 
 
Q: And when you were asked if Haziz was in 
the kitchen the first time, you just didn‟t answer 
that question, didn‟t you? 
 
A: No, I didn‟t.  
 
Q: Because your Uncle Haziz is like a father to 
you, right? 
 
A: Oh, yeah. 
 
Q: And you don‟t want to see him go to jail? 
 
MR. IBRAHIM: Judge, I‟m going  
to object. 
 
 THE COURT: Over -- 
 
 MR. IBRAHIM: This is her witness. 
 
 THE COURT: -- overruled.  Please. 
 
 THE WITNESS: He‟s already in jail. 
 
 THE COURT: Repeat the question. 
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Q: You don‟t want to see him get convicted and 
spend more time in jail, do you? 
 
A: He‟s already in jail. 
 
After the jury was dismissed for the day, defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial, arguing that Haziz had been prejudiced 
by Freeman‟s statements that he was already in jail.  The 
District Court declined to grant a mistrial but invited defense 
counsel to submit a cautionary instruction.  Defense counsel 
did so, and the Court read the instruction to the jury the next 
morning.   
 
D.  Allegations by Alternate Juror 
 Following three days of evidence, the trial concluded 
and the District Court instructed the jury.  The Court then 
separated the two alternate jurors, who did not participate in 
deliberations, and twelve jurors repaired to the jury room to 
deliberate.  After approximately two hours, the jury returned a 
unanimous verdict finding Haziz guilty on both counts.  The 
Court polled the jury, and each member confirmed his or her 
agreement with the verdict.   
 
After the jury was dismissed and the courtroom had 
emptied, however, one of the alternate jurors approached the 
courtroom deputy and stated that “several” of the jurors had 
told her that “they went along with the verdict even though 
they did not necessarily agree with it.”  The deputy asked the 
alternate juror to write down her name and telephone number, 
as well as the names of the jurors who did not necessarily 
agree with the verdict.  The alternate wrote down her name 
and the name of one other juror, and the deputy passed this 
information along to the District Court.   
 
The next day, the District Court conducted a phone 
conference during which it informed counsel of the alternate 
juror‟s allegations.  Defense counsel moved to interview the 
alternate juror, a request the government opposed.  In a 
memorandum opinion, the Court denied the motion. 
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E.  Sentencing 
 The presentence report (“PSR”) found Haziz to have 
an offense level of 22 and a criminal history category of III, 
which resulted in a guideline range of 51 to 63 months.  
However, because he had a prior felony drug conviction and 
because his offense involved more than five grams of cocaine 
base, Haziz was subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum 
sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).   
 
On March 18, 2011, Haziz appeared for sentencing and 
raised several objections to the PSR.  First, he argued that the 
Court should apply the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), 
which would preclude him from being subject to a mandatory 
minimum sentence.  The Court rejected this argument, 
holding that the FSA, which was passed before Haziz‟s 
sentencing but after his conviction, did not apply to 
defendants who had been convicted prior to its enactment.  
Next, Haziz objected to the calculation of his offense level, 
arguing that: (1) the offense level should reflect only the 
weight of one of the two baggies of crack (i.e. the baggie that 
actually had been tested); and (2) he was entitled to a 
“mitigating role” adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.  
The Court rejected both of these objections as well, and noted 
that, in any event, disagreements as to the offense level were 
moot in light of the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence.  
The Court then sentenced Haziz to 120 months of 
imprisonment with eight years of supervised release.  Haziz 
timely appealed. 
 
II.  Discussion
4
 
 Haziz identifies six separate instances of possible 
error: (1) the disqualification of Greenberg; (2) the denial of 
his motion for a mistrial; (3) the denial of defense counsel‟s 
request to interview the alternate juror; (4) the District Court‟s 
refusal to adopt a “mitigating role” adjustment; (5) the total 
                                                 
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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weight of the drugs involved in the offense; and (6) the use of 
pre-FSA thresholds for determining whether a mandatory 
minimum sentence applied.  No error was committed as to all 
but one of these allegations.  As to that one, we conclude, and 
the government concedes, that in the wake of our decision in 
United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2011), the FSA 
applies and Haziz is not subject to a mandatory minimum 
sentence.  Accordingly, although we affirm the convictions, 
we will remand for resentencing.   
 
A.  Disqualification 
 Haziz argues, first, that the District Court‟s 
disqualification of Greenberg, his privately retained counsel, 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice 
and, thus, that his convictions should be reversed.  We review 
a district court‟s disqualification order in two stages.  “First, 
we exercise plenary review to determine whether the district 
court‟s disqualification was arbitrary—the product of a failure 
to balance proper considerations of judicial administration 
against the right to counsel.”  United States v. Stewart, 185 
F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotations 
omitted).  If the order was not arbitrary, “we then determine 
whether the court abused its discretion in disqualifying the 
attorneys.”  Id.  Because Haziz concedes that the Court “did 
not issue an arbitrary ruling,” the only question is whether it 
abused its discretion in determining that Greenberg‟s 
representation of Haziz gave rise to a serious potential for 
conflict of interest.  We answer that question in the negative. 
 
 “The right to select counsel of one‟s choice . . . has 
been regarded as the root meaning of the [Sixth 
Amendment‟s] constitutional guarantee.”  United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-48 (2006).  “The right to 
counsel of choice, however, is not absolute.  Thus, where 
considerations of judicial administration supervene, the 
presumption in favor of counsel of choice is rebutted and the 
right must give way.”  United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 
1074 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotations omitted).  
A conflict of interest arising from the joint representation of 
criminal co-defendants is one instance in which a defendant‟s 
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right to counsel of choice may be rebutted, as joint 
representation in a criminal case “engenders special dangers 
of which a court must be aware.”5  United States v. Wheat, 
486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).   Indeed, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure place an affirmative duty on district 
courts to investigate when this particular danger appears:     
 
The court must promptly inquire about the 
propriety of joint representation and must 
personally advise each defendant of the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel, including 
separate representation.  Unless there is good 
cause to believe that no conflict of interest is 
likely to arise, the court must take appropriate 
measures to protect each defendant‟s right to 
counsel. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c ).  It is well-established that 
disqualification of counsel is among the “appropriate 
measures” available to a district court in cases of conflict 
caused by joint representation.  See, e.g., Voigt, 89 F.3d at 
1078; United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d 
Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 259 (1984).   
 
 There was no abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s 
disqualification of Greenberg.  The Court recognized that 
different and potentially conflicting defenses were available 
to each co-defendant.  Indeed, Haziz‟s primary argument is 
that he was less culpable than his co-defendant brother 
because he “was merely carrying out [his] instructions.”  
There can be little doubt that this “blame the co-defendant” 
strategy created a potentially serious conflict of interest, and 
Wittels conceded as much when he said that “no workable 
„Chinese Wall‟ could be erected in what is a four lawyer firm 
in which the offices of counsel in this case are adjacent to one 
                                                 
5
 The law makes no distinction between one lawyer and 
multiple lawyers from the same firm representing co-
defendants.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c) (“Joint representation 
occurs when . . . the defendants are represented by the same 
counsel, or counsel who are associated in law practice.”). 
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another and in which there is a common receptionist.”  
   
 Haziz asserts, however, that “the possibility of a 
conflict is not sufficient to disqualify appellant‟s counsel of 
choice.”  The case law says otherwise, and says so 
emphatically.  In Wheat, the leading case in this area, the 
Supreme Court explicitly stated that the presumption in favor 
of a defendant‟s counsel of choice “may be overcome not 
only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing of 
a serious potential for conflict.”  486 U.S. at 164.  This is 
necessary, the Court explained, because district courts are 
required to evaluate possible conflicts in the “murkier pretrial 
context when relationships between parties are seen through a 
glass, darkly.”  Id. at 162.  As such, the Court held that district 
courts must be given “substantial latitude” to take protective 
steps “not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict 
may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common 
cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may 
not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.”  Id. 
at 163.  Our decisions are, of course, in accord.  See, e.g., 
Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1075 ( “Clearly, the potential for serious 
conflicts is a consideration of judicial administration that can 
outweigh a defendant‟s right to counsel of choice.”).   
 
Nor did Wittels‟ withdrawal from the case cure the 
problem.  The District Court found that a serious potential 
conflict exists “if Mr. Greenberg retains any loyalty to his 
firm‟s former client.”  Indeed, this concern had some basis in 
fact in light of Greenberg‟s puzzling decision not to oppose 
Rahmmar‟s motion for a continuance despite having 
represented to the Court that Haziz wished to proceed to trial 
immediately.  In Flanagan, we considered whether a firm that 
had been disqualified from representing several co-defendants 
should have been permitted to continue representing just one 
of the defendants.  679 F.2d at 1076.  In affirming the district 
court‟s disqualification of the entire firm, we explained that 
“[t]he potential for conflict arising from the firm‟s receipt of 
confidential information from all the defendants, and its 
obligations in defending just one of the defendants, perhaps at 
the expense of the others, is obvious.”  Id.; see also Pa. Rules 
of Prof‟l Conduct 1.7 (stating that a conflict exists where 
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“there is a significant risk that the representation . . . will be 
materially limited by the lawyer‟s responsibilities to . . . a 
former client”) (emphasis added).  Given the foregoing, and 
even though Rahmmar had become a former client of the 
firm, the Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
a serious potential for conflict remained and that Greenberg 
should be disqualified.   
 
B.  Denial of Mistrial 
 Haziz next argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying him a mistrial.  As described above, 
Haziz‟s motion for a mistrial was prompted by the testimony 
of his niece, Devinearth Freeman, who twice made unsolicited 
mention of the fact that Haziz was “already in jail” in 
response to the prosecutor‟s questions.  After the jury had 
been excused for the day, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial, alleging prejudice.  The Court denied the motion, but 
stated: “[D]o you want a cautionary instruction? . . . I will 
give it tomorrow morning after you consult with the 
Government, assuming it‟s a reasonable cautionary, I‟ll be 
happy to give it.”  Defense counsel agreed and drafted the 
following instruction, which the Court read to the jury the 
next morning: “Ladies and gentlemen, I‟m instructing you to 
disregard, from your consideration, any testimony which 
might have discussed the custody status of Mr. Haziz Self.”   
 
 We review a district court‟s denial of a mistrial for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Hakim, 344 F.3d 324, 
328 (3d Cir. 2003).  There is no dispute that Freeman‟s 
mention of the fact that Haziz was “already in jail” was 
improper.  However, “[a] mistrial is not required where 
improper remarks were harmless, considering their scope, 
their relation to the context of the trial, the ameliorative effect 
of any curative instructions and the strength of the evidence 
supporting the conviction.”  United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 
131, 140 (3d Cir. 2007).   Here, Freeman‟s statements were 
brief, isolated, and unsolicited by the prosecutor.  As such, 
when viewed in the context of the entire trial, their impact 
was negligible—especially considering the very strong 
evidence adduced by the government.  Moreover, out of an 
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abundance of caution, the District Court instructed the jury to 
disregard any testimony as to Haziz‟s custody status, the 
instruction defense counsel requested.  In light of the 
principle that a jury is presumed “to disregard inadmissible 
evidence inadvertently presented to it,” Greer v. Miller, 483 
U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1978), this instruction neutralized the 
prejudice—if any—from Freeman‟s two improper responses.  
The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Haziz‟s 
motion for a mistrial.   
 
C.  Allegations by Alternate Juror 
 Haziz argues, next, that he is entitled to a new trial 
because the District Court abused its discretion in denying his 
request to conduct a post-trial interview of an alternate juror.  
As noted above, the alternate juror—who did not participate 
in jury deliberations—approached a courtroom deputy after 
the verdict had been returned and reported that “„several‟ of 
the regular jurors had told her that they went along with the 
verdict even though they did not necessarily agree with it.”  
The Court related this exchange to counsel, and defense 
counsel requested permission to interview the alternate juror, 
a request that the Court denied.   
 
 We review for abuse of discretion a district court‟s 
handling of allegations of irregularities in jury deliberations.  
United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 914 (3d Cir. 1996).  
At the outset, we note that post-trial interviews of discharged 
jurors are generally disfavored, as we are “„always reluctant 
to haul jurors in after they have reached a verdict in order to 
probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct or 
extraneous influences.‟”  United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 
90, 97 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Ianniello, 866 
F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 3-606 Weinstein’s 
Federal Evidence § 606.06 (2011) (“The federal courts are 
notoriously reluctant to permit either informal post-verdict 
interviews with or testimony from discharged jurors.”).   This 
reluctance to allow post-trial questioning of jurors stems from 
a recognition that “post-verdict inquiries may lead to evil 
consequences: subjecting juries to harassment, inhibiting 
juryroom deliberation, burdening courts with meritless 
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applications, increasing temptation for jury tampering and 
creating uncertainty in jury verdicts.”  Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 
97 (citation and internal quotations omitted).  Surely, then, 
post-verdict inquiries of alternate jurors who never 
participated in deliberations, much less in return of the 
verdict, should be given short shrift, indeed.   
 
 We need not reprise the District Court‟s careful 
consideration of defense counsel‟s request to interview the 
alternate juror.  Suffice it to say that all Haziz argues to us is 
that questioning the alternate juror “would have been proper 
to determine if any outside influence [was] improperly 
brought to bear [sic] upon any juror.”  But nowhere did the 
alternate juror even suggest that there had been any outside 
influence on any juror.  At best, and we stress at best, the 
alternate juror‟s statement suggests only that some jurors may 
have persuaded others to set aside their misgivings and vote to 
convict.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Haziz‟s request.  
 
D.  Guidelines Calculations 
 Haziz raises two arguments related to the calculation of 
his guideline sentencing range.  First, he argues that he was 
entitled to a downward adjustment for a “mitigating role” 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.  Second, he argues that his 
offense level should have reflected only the weight of one of 
the two baggies of crack, because only one baggie was 
actually tested by the drug lab.  The District Court considered 
and rejected both of these arguments.
6
  We review its findings 
for clear error.  United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 
237 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 322 
(3d Cir. 2001).   
 
                                                 
6
 The District Court noted that these arguments were 
academic in light of the applicable mandatory minimum 
sentence.  As discussed below, however, Haziz is not subject 
to a mandatory minimum, and so it is necessary for us to 
address the arguments he makes as to the guidelines 
calculations.   
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1.  “Mitigating Role” Adjustment 
 Haziz portrays himself to us as a loyal—albeit hard-
luck—brother whose crime resulted only from the desire to 
help out a wayward sibling.  In keeping with this theme, 
Haziz argues that the District Court committed clear error 
when it declined to grant him a discretionary “mitigating role 
adjustment” under the guidelines.  See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.  At 
sentencing, the Court stated: “I don‟t think a reduction or a 
departure . . . is warranted. . . . I have the discretion to grant it, 
but I choose not to grant it based on the evidence that was 
presented at trial.”  This determination was not clearly 
erroneous.   
 
The guidelines permit the downward adjustment of a 
defendant‟s offense level if the defendant was “substantially 
less culpable than the average participant.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 
cmt. n.3.  Specifically, the “mitigating role adjustment” 
provision states:   
 
Based on the defendant‟s role in the offense, 
decrease the offense level as follows:  
 (a) If the defendant was a minimal 
participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 
4 levels.  
 (b) If the defendant was a minor 
participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 
2 levels.  
In cases falling between (a) and (b), 
decrease by 3 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.  In determining whether this adjustment is 
warranted, we have instructed district courts to consider “such 
factors as the nature of the defendant‟s relationship to other 
participants, the importance of the defendant‟s actions to the 
success of the venture, and the defendant‟s awareness of the 
nature and scope of the criminal enterprise.”  United States v. 
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation and 
internal quotations omitted).  We have also observed that 
“[t]he district courts are allowed broad discretion in applying 
this section, and their rulings are left largely undisturbed by 
 16 
the courts of appeal.”  Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d at 238.  
 
Haziz points out that it was his brother, Rahmmar, who 
spoke to the CI and set up the drug deal, and repeatedly 
asserts that he “was merely carrying out the instructions of his 
co-defendant brother.”  As such, Haziz characterizes his 
involvement in the offense as “simply receiving the payment 
for a previously negotiated transaction,” and stresses that he 
told the CI that he “[doesn‟t] do this anymore.”   
 
Even accepting this as true, it cannot be said that the 
District Court erred, much less clearly erred, in denying Haziz 
a mitigating role adjustment.  Haziz did not indirectly further 
a criminal activity or further that activity in some minor way; 
to the contrary, he directly engaged in the very act at the heart 
of the criminal enterprise—namely, the distribution of drugs 
in exchange for money.  Thus, under the Headley factors set 
forth above, “the importance of [his] actions to the success of 
the venture” could not be clearer.  Headley, 923 F.2d at 1084.  
Additionally, the fact that Haziz was trusted to handle the 
distribution of wholesale quantities of drugs worth hundreds 
of dollars speaks to the remaining Headley factors: his 
relationship with the other members involved in the criminal 
enterprise and his knowledge of the nature and scope of the 
venture.  See Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d at 241 (“[T]he amount 
of drugs with which the defendant is charged may be an 
important factor which weighs heavily in the court‟s view of 
the defendant‟s relative culpability.”).  While there may well 
be two permissible views as to whether the evidence supports 
a mitigating role adjustment, “the factfinder‟s choice between 
them cannot be clearly erroneous.”  Anderson v. Bessemer 
City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).    
 
2.  Weight of Drugs 
Mr. Varughese, the government‟s forensic chemist, 
testified that in accordance with standard lab procedures, he 
tested the contents of only one of the two baggies purchased 
by the CI from Haziz in the arranged drug transaction.  
Seizing on this fact, Haziz argues that he should only be held 
responsible for the weight of the crack in the tested baggie 
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(5.494 grams), not the total weight of both baggies (12.05 
grams).  At sentencing, the District Court determined that “the 
calculation was appropriate at 12.05 grams.”  The Court did 
not clearly err in reaching this conclusion.   
 
The government bears the burden of proving the 
weight of the drugs involved in an offense by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  United States v. McCutchen, 992 F.2d 22, 25 
(3d Cir. 1993).  When a defendant “challenges a drug quantity 
estimate based on an extrapolation from a test sample, the 
government must show, and the court must find, that there is 
an adequate basis in fact for the extrapolation and that the 
quantity was determined in a manner consistent with accepted 
standards of reliability.”  Id. at 25-26.  This does not, 
however, require the government to adduce any sort of 
statistical evidence; rather, “reasonable reliability is the 
touchstone of the determination.”  Id. at 26.   
 
Haziz simply recites this “reasonable reliability” 
standard and offers a conclusory statement that the standard 
was not met.  The record, however, shows otherwise.  
Although Varughese tested only one of the two bags of 
suspected crack, he explained that this was standard and 
accepted procedure for the Philadelphia Police Department: 
“[A]ccording to our lab policy, we are analyzing only 10 
percent of the exhibit we are submitted . . . . [T]hat same 
policy [applies] for every case we are getting.”7  Varughese 
emphasized that the police lab was fully accredited and that, 
in order to maintain accreditation, it “need[s] to show for each 
and every case [the] same procedures,” regardless of the 
number of items submitted for testing.  Additionally, he 
testified that the baggies purchased by the CI had a similar 
appearance, size, and packaging.  Finally, the fact that the CI 
agreed to buy one-half ounce (about fourteen grams) of crack 
                                                 
7
 For example, if one thousand small packets are submitted 
for testing, the lab analyzes one hundred packets.  Varughese 
went on to explain that if the lab gets sixteen bags (which it 
rounds up to twenty), it analyzes two.  If only fourteen bags 
are submitted (which it rounds down to ten), the lab analyzes 
only one.   
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gives rise to a strong inference that the 12.05 grams of chunky 
white substance in the two baggies was crack cocaine, even 
without the fact, and fact it be, that the two baggies were 
purchased from the same source in the same transaction.  In 
light of the use of an established testing procedure, the similar 
size and appearance of the packages, and the incriminating 
circumstances of the transaction, the weight calculation was 
reasonably reliable.  As such, the District Court‟s 
determination of the quantity of drugs involved in the offense 
was not clearly erroneous.   
 
E.  Fair Sentencing Act 
Finally, Haziz argues that we should vacate his 
sentence and remand for a de novo resentencing in light of the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”).  The FSA, which was 
aimed at reducing sentencing disparity between crack cocaine 
and powder cocaine offenses, raised the amount of crack that 
triggered a mandatory minimum sentence from five grams to 
twenty-eight grams.  Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010).  Because Haziz‟s 
offense involved approximately twelve grams of crack, he fell 
within the class of offenders who stood to benefit from this 
change in law.  However, although the FSA already had been 
signed into law at the time of sentencing, the government 
argued that it should not apply because Haziz had been 
convicted prior to its enactment.  The District Court agreed, 
and Haziz was thus subjected to a ten-year mandatory 
minimum sentence, which was duly imposed.   
 
A few months after sentencing, however, we decided 
United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2011).  We held 
in Dixon that the FSA applies to all defendants sentenced 
after its enactment, regardless of whether their offenses and 
convictions predated its passage.  In light of Dixon, the 
government concedes that “the appropriate remedy is to 
vacate [Haziz‟s] sentence and remand the case for a de novo 
resentencing proceeding.”  We agree, and will vacate the 
sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with the 
provisions of the FSA.   
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IV.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
convictions but will vacate the sentence and remand for 
resentencing.      
 
